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A N D Y  B Y F O R D
TRAUMA AND PATHOLOGY: 
NORMATIVE CRISES AND THE CHILD 
POPULATION IN LATE TSARIST RUSSIA 
AND THE EARLY SOVIET UNION, 1904–1924
T he first quarter of the Russian twentieth century was punctuated by a suc-
cession of cataclysmic upheavals that affected large swathes of the empire’s 
population, striking its state structures and society to the core. These included 
the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) that sparked the 1905 Revolution; the 
First World War, which led to the fall of autocracy in February of 1917; and the 
October Revolution, which spiraled into a bitter civil war (1917–1922). These 
events were not only violently destructive and destabilizing, but also conducive 
to the accelerated formation of an interventionist and totalizing form of wel-
fare/warfare statehood that involved the expansion of a range of governmental 
powers over a population mobilized and acted upon in mass terms.1
In these circumstances, children became one of the most important “sup-
ports” (in the Foucauldian sense) of mass intervention. This included the enlist-
ment of relatively new forms of knowledge, expertise, treatment, and care in 
explicit response to conditions experienced and represented as those of societal 
crisis and collapse. The following three cases in the history of childhood in 
Russia will be discussed in order to show what this entailed: (1) the “epidemic” 
of child suicides diagnosed in the aftermath of the 1905 Revolution; (2) the con-
cern of the Russian public with the detrimental psychological effect that war 
had on children during the First World War; and (3) Soviet efforts to deal with 
child “delinquency” in the early 1920s, a phenomenon generated by the mass 
displacements of the postrevolutionary civil war.
In examining these cases, analysis will focus on the following issues: (a) the 
ways in which societal collapse, prompted by violent events, such as wars or 
revolutions, was conducive to the construction of child pathology as a society-
wide phenomenon, to be targeted through large-scale scientific and professional 
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interventions, both diagnostic and therapeutic; (b) the ways in which the excep-
tionality of such events translated into particular framings of the pathological 
and the deviant in childhood, so much so that children, as major supports for 
normative discourses and practices, came to be identified with the pathological 
as such; and (c) the ambiguous fusion of deviance/pathology, on the one hand, 
and victimhood/trauma, on the other, in the diagnostics and treatment of chil-
dren affected by circumstances of mass violence and societal collapse.
THE SUICIDE CHILD, 1905–1914
In the period between the 1905 Revolution and the First World War, the Russian 
educated public, and the professional stratum in particular, became fascinated 
by what was presented by both media and experts as a veritable “epidemic of 
child suicides”—namely, a remarkable surge of both successful and attempted 
suicides by mostly teenage schoolchildren, which seemed to escalate rapidly 
after the 1905 Revolution, reaching, by 1909, nearly ten times the levels of 
1904 (although these figures then gradually declined by the start of the First 
World War).2 This “epidemic” was in many ways an effect of statistics itself, 
or rather, of the rise of professional interest in this phenomenon and of the 
advances made in the systematic collection of relevant data. Two parallel sta-
tistics were being created simultaneously, both by doctors interested in social 
hygiene: G. V. Khlopin was head of the Medical Section of the Ministry of Public 
Enlightenment (established in 1904) and assembled his statistics primarily from 
school administrative reports, while G. I. Gordon served as secretary to the 
Commission for the Struggle against Schoolchild Suicides of the Society for the 
Protection of Public Health in St. Petersburg and assembled his statistics pri-
marily from newspaper reports, which in turn relied on police records.3
The atmosphere in which this issue was debated was highly politicized: 
“child suicides” (which were, in fact, suicides mostly of youth attending high 
schools) were presented in the context of the sociopolitical upheavals of 1905 
and the government reaction that followed in subsequent years. They were con-
strued as a major symptom of a deep-seated societal crisis, of the internal shocks 
that Russia was experiencing at every level.4 They were used, in particular, to 
critique certain key social institutions, especially the state-administrated, con-
servative, and unreformed high school. On the one hand, high school education 
was vital to the self-identity of imperial Russia’s still relatively small but grow-
ing and expanding middle-class professional intelligentsia—it was, arguably, 
the site of its formation as a class, even more so than the university—yet, on the 
other hand, high school was being consistently identified with the autocratic 
state and denounced as rigidly bureaucratic and arbitrarily disciplinarian.5
452  TRAUMA AND PATHOLOGY 
The phenomenon of “child suicides” mobilized experts in different dis-
ciplines, not only medical professionals (those working in hygiene and psy-
chiatry, in particular), but also educators, psychologists, and jurists (especially 
those interested in criminal anthropology and moral statistics). They all com-
mented on the matter extensively, usually interpreting the phenomenon in 
terms of wider social ills, framing them sometimes in explicitly political terms, 
and sometimes in terms of biosocial “degeneration.”6 By contrast, the foren-
sic examination of specific cases by doctors, school administrations, and the 
police sought to determine particular “reasons” for suicide in each case, to the 
extent that these could be established or hypothesized on the basis of available 
evidence. This involved classifying each case of suicide as belonging to some 
(simplified) category that could then be inserted into the statistical record.7
These categories usually referred to purported external conditions and 
resulting motives. They typically included the pressures of schoolwork and 
exams, home and family difficulties, or “romantic troubles” (which could imply 
unrequited love just as much as unwanted pregnancy). The forensic verdicts 
rarely went into either depth or detail. However, the category that became 
the most prominent in the course of the 1900s, and especially in the context of 
the post-1905 statistical surge or “epidemic,” was psychopathology, however 
vaguely and nontechnically labeled and applied in practice. Mental state aber-
rations were usually co-diagnosed with various anthropometric abnormalities 
or sickliness of one kind or another and were often associated with “heredity” 
(i.e., a family history of pathology).
Thus, the forensic diagnosis of psychopathology stood, in fact, for abnor-
mality and deviance as such. Moreover, among the statistical categories avail-
able, this was the only one that did not express a motive or external context 
for the act, but established, diagnostically and forensically, a more general 
“underlying cause” (underdetermined and mysterious as it was). And this 
was why the majority of “child suicides,” especially when there was no clearly 
established motive, came to be included in this latter category. What is more, 
even in the case of other verdicts, such as exam pressure or romantic troubles, it 
was understood that some kind of (loosely “psychological”) pathology was still 
likely to be underpinning them. This kind of forensic diagnosis was commonly 
given by school doctors who thereby exculpated the school and the family of 
any responsibility, excused the police from pursuing the matter further, and 
allowed a decent burial in the religious tradition. “Child suicide” came to be 
understood as a pathological case by definition.8
And yet, diagnoses that referred to some inherent individual pathology 
were carried out side by side with overarching critiques of pernicious school 
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regimes, degenerating sociobiological conditions in families, and the moral-
political crisis of Russian society, especially in the wake of the violent distur-
bances of 1905.9 These two moves coalesced into an ambiguous construction of 
the suicide child: on the one hand, child suicides appeared as woeful victims 
of external factors, vulnerable “organisms” suffering traumas inflicted upon 
them by a society in crisis and by social institutions not fit for purpose (above 
all the repressive school, but also the disintegrating family unit); on the other, 
they were embodiments of the pathological in society more generally; they were 
manifestations of “school suicides” in the abstract, which the educated society 
and professionals in particular took upon themselves to “struggle against.”10
This pattern of all-out “struggle” with a pathology on an epidemic scale, 
a pathology embodied by the stricken child population, will be repeated in 
other cases (for example, the “battle against delinquency” or the “fight against 
defectiveness” in the Soviet 1920s).11 However, in the period between 1905 
and the First World War, very little actual “struggle” was, or indeed could be, 
done against suicides.12 Members of the professional intelligentsia formed the 
Commission for the Struggle against Schoolchild Suicides, but they had to 
admit that the best they could do was to research the phenomenon in terms of 
psychiatric expertise and moral statistics and to critique the general conditions 
of society and the character of institutions deemed responsible for the care of 
the children, namely the school and the family.13 It was usually understood that 
what was required for things to genuinely improve in such an extreme case as 
mass “child suicides” was the radical transformation of the very foundations 
of society. This did not mean that these professionals were calling for political 
revolution: what this discourse was doing was articulating and framing a nor-
mative crisis.
Vital to “the child” becoming the prime support of this discourse was the 
child’s ambiguous “otherness” from the fully developed and adequately social-
ized adult (the ideally formed member of the educated, professional middle 
class). In reality, many of the “children” committing suicides were youths who 
could be as old as twenty, and what qualified them as “children” was that they 
were most often still in high school.14 In the broadly evolutionist understand-
ing, shared by most participants in these debates, especially doctors, “the child” 
could not be identified with the adult. It was a radically distinct category, 
presented as on a par with those affected by mental illness or forms of mental 
deficiency (“retardation”), with animals, or with the “primitive man.” Yet the 
concern that the educated public and the experts showed was above all for 
the suicides of schoolchildren in high school education—i.e., children of the 
very professional intelligentsia that was diagnosing, studying, and expressing 
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concern about this most troubling, fatal form of pathology. Indeed, “school-
child suicides” became such a focal point of public anxiety because it made 
contradictory this highly articulate group’s idea(l)s of its very own biosocial 
self-(re)production and evolution as the empire’s pivotal social stratum.15
THE WAR CHILD, 1914–1917
During the First World War, public and professional interest in the epidemic of 
“child suicides” was replaced by a new moral panic—the effect that war, espe-
cially the new kind of total warfare, had on the psyche of the child.16 As with 
“child suicides,” the sense of “epidemic” was largely the effect of the prolifera-
tion of data on this topic and the ratcheting up of debate around it, both in the 
regular press and in more specialist publications, mostly educationalist ones. 
The concern was less with psychological “war wounds” and more with the 
transformations that the war appeared to be exercising on the children’s moral 
core. Yet the effect of the war on children’s moral being was construed largely 
in terms of its impact on their “psychology.”
The phenomenon of children being interested in military matters and “play-
ing war” was hardly new.17 There were militaristic child organizations in Russia 
well before the First World War, and children’s interest in war had already been 
observed during the Russo-Japanese conflict in 1904. As early as 1914, children 
were being incorporated into Russia’s patriotic propaganda and featured regu-
larly in it; they were recognized as an important part of the population to be 
mobilized into total war, literally (for military training or work in the rear) and 
symbolically (as valuable assets in displays of patriotism).18 There was even a 
sense that the spirit of war might be beneficial to children—rousing their love 
of the Fatherland and inspiring heroism in the case of the boys and inducing 
selfless dedication on the home front in the case of the girls.19
However, what very soon started to concern Russian professionals (espe-
cially teachers, but also some psychologists and psychiatrists) was increasing 
evidence of the children’s apparently unusual degree of curiosity about, uncriti-
cal fascination with, and strong attraction to wartime violence, as presented to 
them by the media of the day: the newspapers, illustrated journals, popular 
readings, pamphlets, posters, satirical cartoons, and postcards.20 Children’s 
war games and war rhetoric became highly disturbing to commentators: they 
appeared as gross perversions of the romanticization of both war and child-
hood—an effect generated by their very combination.
Naturally, children’s actual responses to and engagements with the war 
were highly varied, but the intelligentsia became obsessed with the idea of 
children being somehow fundamentally transformed by war, even “possessed” 
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by it, acting as if in a state of hypnosis or intoxication. Public concern with 
the “militarization of childhood” started with anecdotal reports, but soon led 
to more systematic studies carried out by teacher organizations as well as by 
psychologists specializing in the study of childhood (e.g., M. M. Rubinshtein). 
They all used as their main methodology questionnaires on children’s reading 
practices, personal interests, and worldviews, but they also collected and ana-
lyzed children’s drawings, diaries, and schoolwork.21
The war gave new focus, relevance, and impetus to these methodologies 
of “child study,” which had been pioneered in the United States by G. Stanley 
Hall.22 Psychologists, teachers, and parents involved in this strand of the move-
ment in Russia keenly observed, noted, and commented on the war-related 
changes in the behavior of the children in their care, changes in the topics of 
their conversations, in the character of their games, in the subjects of their 
artwork, in the discourse of their school essays. They were fascinated by the 
children’s remarkable susceptibility to propaganda messages and imagery, 
especially their tendency to take these messages too literally or too far. They 
took all this as evidence of the distinctive character (the aforementioned “oth-
erness”) of the child psyche, one that required careful professional handling, 
rooted in emergent specialist knowledge.
It was argued that wartime propaganda and media reporting seemed to 
lead children away from the healthy path of emotional, moral, and civilizational 
development that the educators were hoping to instill in them. The primary 
worry was that exposure to war imagery was awakening in children base 
instincts such as cruelty and violence, divesting them of a sense of right and 
wrong (for instance, when it came to inflicting pain on whoever or whatever 
represented the hated “Germans” in their games). It was regularly suggested 
that children seemed more chauvinistic and violent than adults, even in play 
(taking it out on the weakest among them or abusing animals). They were pre-
sented as enjoying mock executions even more than mock battles. One could 
apparently observe these changes even in children who before the war showed 
quite the opposite inclinations and character traits, and girls seemed just as 
vicious and aggressive as boys.
Descriptions of children in areas near the front line, in Ukraine, referred 
to similar disturbing transformations. They included, for example, reports on 
village children playing with the frozen corpses of enemy combatants that they 
would discover in the snow, inevitably desecrating them in the process. In this 
case, the emphasis of the observer was on the similarity that such acts had 
with the most natural of children’s games, evidenced by the simple, innocent 
enjoyment that the children displayed as they played with the corpse. The “war 
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child” and its “games” emerge here as inherently uncanny (in the Freudian 
sense)—unsettling in their combination of familiarity and alien-ness.23
Russia’s professional intelligentsia (and the education profession in particu-
lar) saw their vocation as the raising of future builders of civilization in their 
own image. Yet in conditions of war, “children” were turned into a terrifying 
image of the inherent collapsibility of the very foundations of civilization; it was 
in the children that the ideals of civilized humanity seemed to decline first. And 
as with the “suicide child,” the stakes were greater than the fate of the children 
themselves. The concern with children’s souls was largely an enactment of the 
more general terror of the breakdown and the hope of the renewal of norms in 
the context of their crumbling in the midst of wartime destruction. As expressed 
by one of Russia’s many commentators on the effects of war on children:
The present war, with all its terrible features, is preoccupying people’s 
thoughts and feelings. It has also penetrated our elementary schools, and 
has completely gripped the lively and impressionable minds of children. The 
lessons of human history show us that war degrades people and stimulates 
bestial feelings in man. The present generation of children, finding itself 
surrounded by profound experiences, will feel itself under the power of the 
events it is living through for the rest of its life. There is no doubt that the 
Great World War will show us new paths to life, and right now we must 
prepare ourselves for new, more viable educational principles.24
THE DELINQUENT CHILD, 1917–1924
The First World War already saw growing numbers of displaced and orphaned 
children who found themselves outside parental care, education, or work, 
roaming the streets and engaging in delinquent and criminal behavior, includ-
ing begging, theft, and prostitution. The situation was greatly exacerbated by 
the two 1917 revolutions and the ensuing civil war. Estimates for 1921–22, the 
worst years due to a bout of famine in the Volga region, went up to several mil-
lion displaced children, with figures then dropping to below half a million by 
1923, and lower still from then on (although statistics for this kind of phenom-
enon are notoriously unreliable).25 The problem of the so-called besprizorniki 
(literally, “the unsupervised”), the masses of homeless waifs, emerged as one of 
the key areas of population-wide intervention of the young Soviet state.
This issue played a major part in the establishment of new welfare struc-
tures in the midst and the immediate aftermath of revolutionary upheaval 
and war communism, involving practices which combined police, bureau-
cratic, medical, juridical, educational, and social welfare measures. Different 
Commissariats, especially those of education and health, as well as the police, 
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engaged with the problem, setting up a number of specialized commissions 
and other bodies to deal with it. The key measures were the (usually forcible) 
removal of unsupervised children from the streets; their medical, psychologi-
cal, and pedagogical assessment; and then their placement in institutions for 
rehabilitation, resocialization, therapy, or correction. An extensive system of 
receivers, observation-distribution points, and specialized children’s homes, 
communes, clinics, reformatories, schools, and labor placements were created. 
They varied in their regimes, practices, and levels of care depending on location 
or on the Commissariat they belonged to. Most of them suffered from a dire 
lack of resources and staff. Overall, rehabilitation included a combination of 
hygiene measures and different forms of disciplinary civilizing through which 
the children were expected to be turned into a literate, socially useful, morally 
responsible, and politically informed labor force.
Within a very short period of time, the phenomenon of the besprizorniki 
turned “children” as a category into a target of state intervention on a truly 
mass scale, something unprecedented in the history of Russian statehood. Prior 
to 1917, the “children of the nation” were, in practice, a rather narrow cat-
egory. The latter’s normative core was the children of the urban, (more or less) 
educated classes—the limited constituency of those who went to school, and 
above all those who were expected to go on to at least some form of secondary 
education. The scale of wartime and revolutionary upheaval, which produced 
the hordes of besprizorniki, radically transformed “children” as a target group of 
professional intervention and study, now actively overseen by the new socialist 
state. Furthermore, the besprizorniki, understood as a by-product of the violent 
downfall of the long-compromised ancien régime, became the principal support 
for extensive normative reframing in the first years of Soviet power. Put differ-
ently, in the context of the Russian civil war and its aftermath, the besprizorniki 
emerged as the category that, temporarily, established a new core of “the chil-
dren of the nation”; they did so by exemplifying the normative crisis brought 
about by the violent upheavals of war and revolution, prompting, however, for 
this very reason, their pathologization.
The treatment of the besprizorniki in this period of postrevolutionary crisis 
was built on Russia’s experiences in the treatment of juvenile offenders and 
delinquents from the prerevolutionary era.26 Already prior to 1917, there was 
pressure from emerging experts in criminal anthropology (especially Dmitrii 
Dril) to introduce into colonies for young offenders what was referred to as 
“medico-pedagogical supervision” (mediko-pedagogicheskii nadzor), to be headed 
by psychiatrists.27 The idea of “corruptedness” (isporchenost or porochnost, both 
associated with porok, meaning “vice”), which dominated discourse on juvenile 
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delinquency in the late nineteenth century, was modulated in a medical key. 
Increasing numbers of delinquent children were seen as suffering from different 
forms of psychopathology, including that of “moral defectiveness” (moral’naia 
defektivnost’), understood as a pathological absence of the ability to distinguish 
right from wrong.28 Between 1900 and the 1910s, key psychiatric and psycholog-
ical societies in both Moscow and St. Petersburg were commissioned to advise 
juvenile correctional facilities. Some Russian psychiatrists started to see these 
institutions as loci of valuable psychiatric material as well as sites for develop-
ing new research methodologies. However, in tsarist times, juvenile colonies 
and shelters were, firstly, marginal institutions, and secondly, their medicaliza-
tion took place in the context of research and diagnostic theory, while there was 
little or no psychiatric intervention in the correction or treatment of inmates.
Important, ideologically motivated changes in the tackling of delinquency 
as a social problem took place soon after the Bolshevik coup in October 1917.29 
In 1918, the new powers published the decree “On Commissions for Juvenile 
Affairs,” which eliminated both courts and prisons for juveniles. From then 
on, young offenders were expected to be brought to these new commissions, 
and the latter were then to refer them to educational or medical establish-
ments rather than places of detention. These commissions’ membership was 
expected to include a psychiatrist, an educator, and a magistrate, as well as 
social workers. The 1918 decree itself did not use the term “morally defective,” 
but the unpublished rationale produced by the commission featured this label 
as its key term.30 What is more, the government (Sovnarkom) decree of March 
4, 1920, “On the Matter of Juveniles Accused of Socially-dangerous Acts” radi-
cally widened the meaning of “moral defectiveness.” While in the tsarist era 
this term was used as merely one, quite specific, pathological category of young 
offenders, it now became a default term for juvenile deviance, specifically in the 
context of the surge of besprizornost’.31 The notion of “moral defectiveness” was 
intentionally broad and could be flexibly subdivided into different kinds and 
levels of “pathology,” leading to a variety of possible “treatments.”
Article 7 of the decree of March 4, 1920, stated: “The upbringing, training 
and treatment [lechenie] of morally defective juveniles accused of socially-
dangerous acts is a medico-educational task carried out by the Commissariats 
of Education and Health in suitable medico-educational establishments [lech-
ebno-vospitatel’nye uchrezhdeniia], to which they are to be referred to by the 
Commissions for Juvenile Affairs.”32 Thus, what in the tsarist era used to be 
called “correctional-educational” (ispravitel’no-vospitatel’nye) facilities now 
became “medico-educational” ones. Young offenders were no longer branded 
“juvenile offenders” (maloletnie prestupniki), a term that referred to the criminal 
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act, but “morally defective” or “ethically backward” (moral’no-defektivnye and 
eticheski otstalye), terms that identified an inherent pathology or deviance in 
the offender. Moreover, the “struggle with besprizornost’” was made to overlap 
with the “struggle with defectiveness,” the latter referring to a whole range 
of mental and physical “deficiencies,” all lumped together into the target of 
a multipronged (and rather chaotic) system of state intervention focused on 
the pathological and the deviant in the child population. In this context, the 
“defectologist-teacher” became a key specialism alongside the doctor.33
However, other, rather more euphemistic labels, such as “exceptional child-
hood” (iskliuchitel’noe detstvo) and “difficult childhood” (trudnoe detstvo), were 
also used on a regular basis.34 Such phrasings and their elaborations and justi-
fications invariably referred to a de facto context of “trauma,” with the children 
in question appearing as victims of external circumstances. The phrase “victims 
of besprizornost’” was also used. Yet these terms could still be easily transposed 
into labels that applied forms of deviance or pathology onto the children them-
selves, by describing them rather than their childhoods as inherently “difficult” 
or at least “difficult to educate/socialize” (trudnovospituemye).35
The range of issues that these children were affected by and displaying was, 
in reality, broad and varied. At the First All-Russian Conference for the Struggle 
with Child Defectiveness in 1921, different types of care institutions were being 
proposed, depending on which category of “difficulty” the child belonged to: 
how they responded to educational measures; whether they required isolation; 
how much medical, especially psychiatric, expertise was necessary; and how 
difficult they were to manage and discipline. In most cases it was the regime 
of daily life at the institution in question that was deemed to have the core 
therapeutic/rehabilitative function, the idea being especially to rebalance the 
delinquent child’s “will,” diagnosed as over- or underdeveloped.
When the situation was exacerbated by the 1921 famine, which caused huge 
flows of refugees from the affected areas, mostly the Volga provinces, starva-
tion became a key case for the ambiguous fusion of trauma and pathology in 
expert discourse on the besprizorniki. Doctors, in particular, sought to connect 
the trauma of “exceptional childhood,” as experienced by the starving bespr-
izorniki, with the pathology of “moral defectiveness.” There was considerable 
interest among psychiatrists in how hunger transformed normal psychologi-
cal development. It was argued that protracted periods of starvation directly 
affected basic biological instincts, transforming the entire personality, including 
the stunting and disabling of the child’s moral senses.36
Yet by 1924 the numbers of the besprizorniki were in decline: besprizornost’ 
as an “epidemic” started to look eradicable. This had a direct effect on how 
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besprizornost’ itself was framed as an object of state intervention. The First 
Moscow Conference for the Struggle with Besprizornost’ (March 16–17, 1924) 
challenged the label “morally defective,” bringing about its official rejection.37 
Nonetheless, the openness and vagueness of what had been entailed by this 
term allowed for its tacit survival in practice, both among those who, as profes-
sionals, dealt with delinquents on a daily basis, and among the general public.38 
What was being purged in the elimination of the term “moral defective” from 
official discourse was only the sense of inherent deviance, not that of “pathol-
ogy.” The revision of terminology expressed mostly the regained optimistic 
view (one which reflected the real decline in the numbers of besprizorniki) that 
these children could, as a population at least, be successfully treated and reha-
bilitated. Yet this did not remove the idea that they (or at least an exemplary 
core among them) were physically unhealthy, constitutionally weak, with a 
deficient “personality,” their “pathology” being construed mostly as abnormal 
reactions to environmental stimuli.
In fact, the era of the New Economic Policy (NEP; 1921–28), which implied 
a grudging “tactical retreat” by the Bolsheviks from the revolutionary dic-
tatorship of the proletariat to a mixed economy that permitted the return of 
small-scale capitalism, was marked by continued anxieties about the morally 
unstable and ideologically problematic context for the building of a new society, 
including fears of rising criminality and degeneration.39 The conditions of pre-
carious revolutionary transformation, characteristic of the 1920s, were haunted 
by a continued sense of social crisis and normative ambiguity. It is this crisis, 
born of a revolutionary utopia under the threat of collapse, that the Bolsheviks 
were responding to by turning the country’s juvenile population into one of 
the principal “supports” for the construction of a new normative model—the 
“New Soviet Person” as an idealized representation of the future emancipated, 
conscious, and psychophysiologically transformed socialist citizenry.40
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE MASS CHILD, 1924–1936
Furthermore, throughout the 1920s, the new socialist state was still wrestling 
with its internal “civilizing mission”—specifically the question of how best 
to organize mass education for large numbers of children nurtured within a 
population with very low preexisting levels of literacy and education. In this 
context, and especially in the effort to raise educational levels as rapidly as pos-
sible, the boundary between educational norms for children in the expanding 
network of regular schools and those attending special schools became porous: 
new, progressive, and experimental forms of education that were being speedily 
introduced across Soviet schools by leading Bolshevik educational reformists 
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overlapped with forms of education originally developed as techniques of spe-
cial pedagogy for the “defective.”41 This included the abolition of fixed curricula 
and textbooks; learning conceptualized as real-life exploration; and emphasis 
on practical, especially labor, activities.
These developments need to be viewed in the context of the revolutionary 
transformation of the overall composition of the country’s body politic, which 
under socialism came to include, in principle at least, the totality of the former 
empire’s population. This in and of itself had a huge impact on normative con-
ceptions of child development and socialization. Such a seismic shift of the pop-
ulation of concern prompted a significant normative reframing of “children” as 
targets of intervention, i.e., a performative rearticulation of norms of develop-
ment and socialization, with considerable implications on how upbringing, 
schooling, and welfare were to be organized in the new society. This was juxta-
posed with the ideologically grounded idealization of the “laboring classes” as 
the new bearers of biosocial norms—hence the emphasis in educational practice 
on emulating the material and collective world of work.
By the late 1920s, and especially with the Soviet government’s push towards 
the full implementation of universal schooling (planned for some time, but 
decreed only in 1930, in the context of the first five-year plan), central to edu-
cationalist research into the Soviet child population became the notion of the 
“mass child” (massovyi rebenok).42 A statistical as well as a rhetorical creature, 
the “mass child” was a normative articulation, in the singular, of the (now 
total) Soviet schoolchild population. This notion was rooted in the positivist 
conception of the norm as a statistical average and emerged in the context of the 
remarkable expansion of mass mental and scholastic testing in the Soviet 1920s 
(much of it American in inspiration).43
Around 1927–28 the “mass child” was defined as the prime object of pedol-
ogy (in Russian pedologiia)—the cross-disciplinary “science of the child,” which 
had been supported by the Bolshevik political elite throughout the 1920s as a 
framework for all research related to children, and which was by the end of the 
decade inaugurated as an official science entrusted with managing the process 
of the state’s implementation of universal education.44 In 1928 the Commissariat 
of Education introduced the so-called pedology service across Soviet schools, 
deploying it as a tool for managing educational expansion. This involved the 
appointment of school pedologists (a large percentage of whom were doctors) 
whose task was to assess and stream the school population, referring those 
“below the norm” to a proliferating number of special schools.45 The number of 
these referrals grew to such an extent, however, that in the summer of 1936 the 
Communist Party resolved to close down the program by a radical measure—a 
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Party decree that proclaimed pedology itself a pernicious, classist, and racist 
pseudoscience that had erroneously over-diagnosed subnormality in the Soviet 
population, especially among the children of workers and ethnic minorities.46
What is important to note here is that those assessed as falling below the 
norm in the late 1920s to the early 1930s were being defined as such in relation 
to the concept of the “mass child.” In other words, the “subnormal” children 
were a function of the construction of a purported universal average for the 
now vastly expanded, in principle total, Soviet schoolchild population. This 
new “subnormal” child at times resembled and often overlapped with earlier 
forms, insofar as these children were often labeled by teachers, school doctors, 
and pedologists as “defective” or “difficult to educate.” However, this form of 
“subnormality,” which rose to prominence between 1924 and 1936 as part of 
a rapid expansion of the population of concern within the newly constructed 
school system, and as an effect and function of a statistically defined norm, 
should not be identified with the above-discussed, very different, constructs 
of child deviance and pathology that emerged in the period between 1905 and 
1924—namely, the “suicide child,” the “war child,” and the “delinquent child.” 
In these latter cases, the abnormal or the deviant arose, by contrast, from the 
ambiguous fusion of trauma and pathology associated with “exceptional child-
hoods,” understood as outcomes of massive societal shocks in the form of war 
and revolution.
CONCLUSION: TR AUMA AND PATHOLOGY 
IN CONDITIONS OF NORMATIVE CRISIS
Violent ruptures, such as wars and revolutions, are commonly treated as events 
exercising a “traumatic” effect on a given population.47 “Collective trauma” is 
usually seen as paralleling and translating into individual trauma, and vice 
versa, often problematically so. However, what is affected by collective upheav-
als are not only the human beings caught up in the events in question; in the 
case of children, it is also not straightforwardly their (“natural”) physical, psy-
chological, or social “development” that is disrupted by said events and experi-
ences. What is being upturned is the very (socially, historically, and culturally 
specific) normative regime (the overarching set of institutions, discourses, and 
practices) that frames the “right,” “healthy” path of biopsychosocial “develop-
ment” and “life” more generally.48
In such circumstances, both the diagnostics of trauma and the therapeutics 
of healing, rehabilitation, and resocialization can be viewed as enactments of a 
normative regime in crisis. “Trauma” is here not simply a “wound” (whether 
collective or individual) to be healed; it is a sign of normative collapse. 
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Moreover, the recovery of a normative regime is not just a matter of “heal-
ing the wound.” The (re)instatement or (re)forging of the norm assumes the 
(re)establishment of the distinction between “right” and “wrong,” and that is 
contingent on the reassertion of pathology. In fact, the recovery of a normative 
regime in crisis, in conditions of “trauma,” generates, of necessity, partial and 
strategic pathologizations of both the individuals and the population at large 
caught up in and affected by the cataclysmic events. This renders the connection 
between “trauma,” as a sign of normative collapse, and “pathology,” as a means 
of the recovery of the norm, intimate, yet ambiguous. However, it is precisely 
the distinction and connection between “trauma” and “pathology” that then 
determines the paths, means, and meanings of rehabilitation, healing, and reso-
cialization in the aftermath of societal shocks.
During the dramatic sociopolitical upheavals of the first quarter of the twen-
tieth century in Russia, including the 1905 revolution, the First World War, the 
revolutions of 1917, and the civil war, children acquired a vital role in Russian 
society’s efforts to overcome a succession of normative crises resulting from 
these events. Children became important not only as foci of public interest and 
mass intervention, but also, and especially, as objects of knowledge-power asso-
ciated with sciences and professions focused on the articulation and enactment 
of biological, psychological, and social norms—“norms of life” in the terms of 
the philosopher of the human sciences and medicine, Georges Canguilhem.49
In conditions of normative crisis, such as those described above, the role of 
“the child” was dual. On the one hand, “the child” was identified with the very 
breakdown of norms: it was turned into a symbol and embodiment of norma-
tive failure; it became a figure of “regression” (e.g., “the moral defective”). 
Yet “the child” could also simultaneously be turned into an emblem of a lost 
or longed-for normative ideal: this could be a set of norms that had suppos-
edly been forsaken in the “fall” and require reinstatement (as in the Tolstoyan, 
romantic “free education” movement, influential in early twentieth-century 
Russian and Soviet pedagogy) or norms that are to be forged anew, as if from 
scratch (e.g., in the idea of the “New Soviet Person” in Bolshevik utopianism).50 
What turned “the child” into such a key figure in this context was its normative 
ambiguity. Indeed, one of the key dichotomies in the history of adult construc-
tions of childhood more generally was that of depravity versus innocence: 
childhood has historically been cast as a moment of both purity and immoral-
ity, both vulnerability and criminality; the child was both a “tabula rasa” and 
a “little savage.”51
At the turn of the twentieth century, “the child” had, as an object of 
study, intervention, and care, been treated primarily as a function of biosocial 
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reproduction and hence also of the adults’ self-reflection. The sense in which 
the child was a human being “in formation” was that an idealized (normal, 
healthy, balanced, civilized) adult (invariably the adult of a particular class) was 
posited as the norm that the child was expected to teleologically transform into, 
or rather (re)produce. Yet this made “the child” not just a function of the defini-
tion of this norm, but also a figure of its fundamental precariousness—of the 
uncertainty, the non-given-ness of the “healthy” path of “development.” It was 
in conditions of wider social collapse, in events such as wars and revolutions, 
that this precariousness came to the fore and that children were foregrounded 
as its embodiments, prompting not just intervention, but also pathologizations 
focused on them. Moreover, as an object of diagnosis and treatment (through 
which norms were rearticulated), “the child” became a function of the recon-
struction of the norms upturned by the exceptional, violent events. “The child” 
served both as a strange “other” to the adult and, at the same time, as an imag-
ined core of the adult’s “self.”
The “epidemic” of child suicides diagnosed in the aftermath of the 1905 
Revolution, the concern with war’s transformative psychological effect on chil-
dren during the First World War, and the early 1920s’ treatment of mass child 
“delinquency” after the upheavals of revolution and civil war are key cases 
of the construction of child pathology as a society-wide phenomenon, to be 
targeted by larger-scale scientific and professional engagements. They demon-
strate gradual progression in the expansion of the population of concern from 
the high school teenage suicide, via the broader (especially in terms of age) and 
less clearly defined group of children affected by war, to the mass phenomenon 
of postwar child delinquency. Even more important than the increasing size 
of the population in question was the shifting normative core of those who 
counted as the “children of the nation,” on whom scientific, professional, and 
public/state intervention was focused.
In each case, though, the children in question, as major supports for norma-
tive discourses and practices, came to be identified with the pathological as 
such. And in each case, there was an ambiguous fusion of deviance/pathology, 
on the one hand, and victimhood/trauma, on the other. In the case of the “epi-
demic” of child suicides, this was produced through a combination of (a) diag-
noses of individual pathology tied to concrete suicide cases; (b) statistical work 
focused on a particular (high school) population; and (c) politicized critiques 
of pernicious school regimes, degenerating family conditions, and the sociopo-
litical crisis more generally. The population that this discourse focused on was, 
crucially, the children of the very professional intelligentsia that was diagnosing 
and “fighting” (the reified idea of) the “child suicide epidemic.” The “suicide 
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child” emerges therefore as emblematic of the crisis of this group’s biosocial 
reproduction in the conditions of sociopolitical upheaval during and after 1905.
In the second case—the heightened public and professional concern with 
the effects of war on the psyche of the child during the First World War—the 
“otherness” of the child’s psyche, which was part of the articulation of the crisis 
of the professional intelligentsia’s own self-understanding as an agent of social 
progress and builder of civilization, was crucial. There was again ambiguity as 
to whether children were, due to their vulnerability, to be considered the first 
victims of war’s inhumanity and their actions thus the manifestation of a form 
of “traumatization,” or whether, on the contrary, the behavior of children in 
these circumstances needed to be pathologized as one of the first symptoms of 
civilization’s collapsibility.
Between 1917 and 1924 the phenomenon of the besprizorniki became the 
principal support for normative reframing; they were the category that, para-
doxically, emerged as a new core of the nation’s children by exemplifying the 
social and normative crisis brought about by war and revolution; this in turn 
prompted their pathologization (above all through the emblematic figure of 
“the moral defective”) as part of reestablishing a new normative regime on the 
ruins of the old one, which, being associated with tsarism, was perceived as 
having collapsed on itself through its own internal contradictions.
From the mid-1920s, in the young Soviet state’s efforts to rapidly raise the 
country’s educational levels, attention was turned onto the now expanded 
population of schoolchildren who were entering the education system. In this 
context, the norms—developmental and educational—through which this new 
schoolchild population was to be framed, were still in flux and ill-established. 
However, the continuing normative crisis was at this point no longer the effect 
of the shock of extrinsic violent events, but of the accelerated expansion of the 
population of concern. Forms of “subnormality” generated in the context of 
the late 1920s’ push towards the full implementation of universal schooling (in 
relation to the notion of the “mass child,” rooted in a positivist conception of the 
statistical average) differed radically from earlier constructs of child pathology 
which were, by contrast, associated with moments of societal shock and were 
produced as functions of particular instances of “collective trauma.” In these 
earlier cases “the child” became a fundamentally disconcerting figure, victim 
and deviant at the same time, situated at the center of a complex and ambigu-
ous web of discourses, practices, and institutions generated in and by condi-
tions of normative collapse, which themselves were conducive to the forging of 
new powers associated with quite particular, twentieth-century forms of both 
statehood and science.
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